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Abstract 
The Waitangi Tribunal has recently found that the te Tiriti o Waitangi, as signed and 
understood in 1840, was not a cession of sovereignty, thus confirming the views of a 
generation of historians. Although some legal scholars have agreed with this view, 
mainstream public law scholarship – and Pākehā constitutional discourse more broadly 
– have not yet caught up. Three textbooks, Joseph’s Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, Palmer and Palmer’s Bridled Power and Morris’ Law Alive each portray the treaty 
as a cession of sovereignty. They do this by overlooking Māori law, history and 
motivations for signing, and by portraying the meaning of the English text as “the” 
treaty. This is particularly problematic because of the authoritative and normative role 
that textbooks have in shaping discourses, both for students and for the general public. 
The myth of cession obscures the violent reality of how the Crown actually acquired its 
power and prevents meaningful constitutional dialogue.  
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,930 words. 
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Treaty of Waitangi 
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I Introduction 
 
The myth that the treaty was a cession of sovereignty is the dominant Pākehā narrative of 
the founding of New Zealand. In this narrative, Māori are understood to have given up 
their sovereignty in art 1 in exchange for property rights in art 2 and equality in art 3. The 
treaty is portrayed as a benign act that has benefitted Māori, and as the moral or political 
basis for the Crown’s sovereignty.  
 
On 14 November 2014, the Waitangi Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) announced the key 
finding of its Te Paparahi o te Raki Stage One Report: that in signing te Tiriti o 
Waitangi, the rangatira of Ngāpuhi did not cede sovereignty.1 This finding was nothing 
new to the generations of Māori who have asserted this claim and to the growing numbers 
of Pākehā and other tauiwi (non-Māori) activists and scholars who have supported them. 
In fact, the Tribunal itself noted that its finding “represents continuity rather than 
change”.2 
 
It is significant, however, that this finding was made by a Crown institution. As Andrew 
Sharp wrote about an earlier report, the significance of the Tribunal’s finding lies in the 
fact that it “if adopted by others in official positions, [it] would deny legitimacy to the 
official constitution under which [the Tribunal] is empowered.”3 This statement is even 
truer of this report, because it is the most detailed inquiry of the Tribunal into the 
meaning and effect of the treaty.   
 
The myth that the treaty was a voluntary cession of sovereignty pervades Pākehā 
discourses of constitutionalism and national identity. Despite this, the majority of 
contemporary New Zealand historians agree that the treaty was not a cession of 
sovereignty, and a large body of research has developed in this area.4 Legal scholarship 
on the treaty also presents a range of nuanced views on the past, present and future of the 
treaty’s meaning and its role in New Zealand’s constitution – in some cases, on the basis 
  
1 Waitangi Tribunal He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti: The Declaration and the Treaty: The Report on Stage 1 
of the Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry (Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 1040, November 2014).  
2 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 526-527. 
3 Andrew Sharp “The Treaty in the Real Life of the Constitution” in Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu 
and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 2005) 308 at 315. 
4 See discussion in Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at ch 8. 
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that it was not a cession of sovereignty.5 However, this work does not appear to have had 
a significant impact on discussions of the treaty in New Zealand’s general scholarship on 
constitutional law.  
 
Analysis of the entirety of this scholarship would be a massive undertaking. Instead, this 
essay focuses on three public law textbooks as an illustration of the portrayal of the treaty 
in Pākehā constitutional law discourses. The three textbooks I have chosen are Phillip 
Joseph’s Constitutional and Administrative Law,6 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew 
Palmer’s Bridled Power7 and Grant Morris’s Law Alive.8 Each suggests that the treaty 
was a cession of sovereignty. 
 
In this paper, I use “te Tiriti” or “the Māori text” to refer to the document that was written 
in te reo Māori and signed by around 500 Māori rangatira and Governor Hobson, on 6 
February 1840 and subsequently. I use “the English text” to refer to the document in 
English signed by 39 rangatira. When talking about both texts together, I use the phrase 
“the treaty”. While it is doubtful whether it is appropriate to refer to the two documents 
together in this way, I use this term because the idea of “the treaty” is common and the 
use of this concept is significant to my analysis. Direct quotes retain the terminology used 
by their authors, but it is generally obvious which document they are referring to. In 
  
5 See, for example, ETJ Durie “The Treaty in Maori History” in William Renwick (ed) Sovereignty and 
Indigenous Rights: The Treaty of Waitangi in International Contexts (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1991) 156; Moana Jackson “The Treaty and the Word: The Colonization of Māori Philosophy” 
in Graham Oddie and Roy Perrett (eds) Justice Ethics and New Zealand Society (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 1; Jane Kelsey A Question of Honour? Labour and the Treaty 1984-1989 (Allen & Unwin, 
Wellington, 1990); Ani Mikaere Colonising Myths Māori Realities: He Rukuruku Whakaaro (Huia, 
Wellington, 2011); Magaret Mutu “Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts” in Malcolm 
Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (eds) Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional 
Change (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2010) 13; Nan Seuffert “Colonising Concepts and the Good Citizen, 
Law’s Deceptions, and the Treaty of Waitangi” (1998) 4 Law Text Culture 69; David V Williams “Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi – Unique Relationship Between Crown and Tangata Whenua?” in IH Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: 
Māori and Pākehā Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989) 64; and 
Joe Williams “Not Ceded But Redistributed” in William Renwick (ed) Sovereignty and Indigenous Rights: 
The Treaty of Waitangi in International Contexts (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1991) 190. 
6 Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2014). 
7 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government (4th 
ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004). 
8 Grant Morris Law Alive: The New Zealand Legal System in Context (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2015). 
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keeping with the Tribunal’s style,9 Māori words are spelt according to modern spelling, 
apart from direct quotes. 
 
In relying heavily on the Tribunal report as a source of history, I am aware of its 
limitations. In particular, the nature of this particular report means that it is focused on 
Ngāpuhi. Other iwi and hapū have their own histories. Some aspects of each history will 
be the same, and others not. It is outside the scope of this essay to investigate the 
understanding of every signatory to te Tiriti. However, it is not a stretch of the 
imagination to suggest that if Ngāpuhi did not cede their sovereignty, then most, if not 
all, other iwi and hapū also did not cede sovereignty. Another limitation is that there are 
several places where the Tribunal discusses an issue at length, without explicitly coming 
to its own conclusion.  
 
As a Pākehā writer with limited understanding of both tikanga Māori and te reo Māori, it 
is inevitable that I cannot adequately understand or portray Māori histories or Māori 
perspectives, and nor would it be appropriate for me to claim to do so. Yet at the same 
time, it is of paramount importance that Pākehā engage with Māori perspectives on te 
Tiriti in order to understand the continuing injustices of colonisation. It is also the 
responsibility of Pākehā to critically engage with dominant Pākehā narratives on te Tiriti, 
as this work should not be left to Māori alone.  
 
The treaty relationship is of course, not a binary relationship between Māori and Pākehā 
(or Māori and the Crown on behalf of Pākehā). The portrayal of it as such leaves out 
those who identify as both Māori and Pākehā, as well as tauiwi who are not Pākehā. The 
emphasis on Pākehā discourses in my paper is a result of the position of power that 
Pākehā occupy in this country – because these discourses are the most entrenched and 
powerful, they are the ones that must be critiqued. 
 
In Part II, I set out the historical context and language of te Tiriti, largely drawing on the 
Tribunal’s report. This shows that Māori could not have voluntarily ceded sovereignty. It 
was not possible in Māori law for them to do so, and it did not make sense politically at 
the time. The Māori text, which  the rangatira signed, does not convey a cession of 
sovereignty; but rather a retention of it, while making room for a Governor for Pākehā. 
 
In Part III, I describe why public law textbooks matter as a subject of critical analysis. I 
suggest that they have an authoritative and normative role in shaping constitutional 
  
9 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 11. 
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discourses. In Part IV I turn to the textbooks portrayal of the treaty as a cession of 
sovereignty. This assumption is bolstered by all of the authors’ failure to engage with 
Māori history, law and motivations. They myth of cession is also underpinned by the 
authors’ portrayal of the English text as the treaty, which is not accurate, given that the 
Māori text was signed. 
 
Finally, in Part V, I turn to the significance of the myth that the treaty was a cession of 
sovereignty. I argue that this narrative helps to shape constructions of Pākehā 
constitutional identity which legitimises the Crown’s sovereignty, masks the violence of 
colonisation and hinders the possibility of meaningful dialogue and change. 
 
II The Treaty was not a Cession of Sovereignty 
 
In this Part, I set out why the treaty was not a cession of sovereignty. There are three key 
reasons for this. First, it was not possible in Māori law to cede sovereignty. Secondly, the 
context shows that this would have been highly undesirable for Māori at the time – 
ceding sovereignty simply would not have made sense. Thirdly, the text of te Tiriti itself 
is clear that sovereignty was not ceded, and this is supported by the oral discussions. At 
the end of this Part, I briefly turn to how the Crown did in fact assert its sovereignty over 
New Zealand. 
 
In the discussion that follows, I draw heavily on the recent Tribunal report Te Paparahi o 
Te Raki, which is the most comprehensive report of the Tribunal on the meaning and 
effect of the treaty. The Tribunal concluded that “the rangatira did not cede their 
sovereignty in February 1840; that is, they did not cede their authority to make and 
enforce law over their people and within their territories.”10 Ngāpuhi’s account to the 
Tribunal is further documented in the book Ngāpuhi Speaks which is the work of an 
independent panel commissioned by Ngāpuhi kuia and kaumātua.11 
 
As with earlier reports, the Tribunal relied on both Māori oral tradition and written 
European/Pākehā sources to form their historical narrative, while recognising the 
limitations of each. It noted that written accounts by European observers “were often self-
serving, one-sided, and based on mistranslations and on European cultural 
  
10 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 526-527. 
11 Susan Healy, Ingrid Huygens and Takawai Murphy Ngapuhi Speaks: He Wakaputanga and Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi Independent Report on Ngāpuhi Nui Tonu Claim (Te Kawariki and Network Waitangi 
Whangarei, Whangarei, 2012).  
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perspectives.”12 On the other hand, Māori oral traditions “ha[ve] their ‘vagaries’ but 
nonetheless may contain ‘inner truths’.”13 The findings of the Tribunal were based on all 
the evidence before it, including the large body of existing historical research. For this 
reason, the Tribunal did not see its decision as radical.14  
 
In the following two Sections, I draw on the Tribunal report to sketch a historical 
narrative that gives some insight into the pre-1840 context. The Tribunal recognised the 
fundamental importance of understanding this context:15 
 
To determine what the treaty meant to its signatories in February 1840, we must first 
understand the parties themselves, and their relationships with each other. We must 
understand how their systems of law and authority worked; the challenges each 
faced as a result of the contact they had prior to February 1840; and their motives 
and intentions as they came to debate and sign te Tiriti. Only then can we determine 
what those parties understood the treaty to mean, and what they believed its effect 
was. 
 
In particular, the Tribunal noted that “[t]hose who have made the assumption that the 
rangatira ceded sovereignty in February 1840 have largely ignored the Māori 
understanding.”16 This point becomes relevant in relation to my discussion of the 
textbooks in Part V. To reject the view that the treaty was a cession of sovereignty, it is 
therefore particularly important to understand the context from the perspective of Māori 
and drawing on Māori sources. 
 
A Not Possible to Cede Sovereignty in Māori Law 
 
The first reason why the treaty was not a cession of sovereignty is that it was not possible 
for Māori to cede sovereignty according to Māori law. Māori law was discussed in detail 
by the Tribunal, which found that “mana, tapu and utu can be seen as fundamental 
aspects of a system of law and authority that applied long before Europeans arrived.”17 In 
  
12 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 9. 
13 At 9. 
14 At 527. 
15 At 498.  
16 At 527. 
17 At 25. 
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Māori law, through whakapapa, “all people and all elements of the physical and spiritual 
worlds were seen as related at a fundamental level.”18  
 
Māori understandings of mana illustrate why ceding sovereignty would have been 
impossible. Mana can be described as “power and authority that is endowed by the gods 
to human beings to enable them to achieve their potential, indeed to excel, and, where 
appropriate, to lead”.19 Because mana derived from whakapapa, mana “could not be 
broken or transferred”.20 For this reason, according to Moana Jackson, “mana was 
absolutely inalienable.”21 Jackson submitted to the Tribunal that “to even contemplate 
giving away mana would have been legally impossible, politically untenable, and 
culturally incomprehensible.”22 Anne Salmond also pointed out that the mana of the 
rangatira “came from the ancestors, and was not theirs to cede”.23 The Tribunal 
concluded that both the claimants, and “most scholars since the 1980s” agreed that ceding 
mana would have been impossible in Māori law.24 
 
It was also impossible to give up tino rangatiratanga. This was described by Margaret 
Mutu as “the exercise of … leadership in order to enhance the mana of the people”, and 
as “the exercise of paramount and spiritually sanctioned power and authority.”25 She 
pointed out that both mana and rangatiratanga are broader than the English concept of 
sovereignty, because sovereignty only derives from human sources while mana and 
rangatiratanga have spiritual elements.26 It would have been impossible to give up either 
in Māori law. This means that it was also impossible to give up “sovereignty”. 
 
B Context and Motivations for the Treaty and te Tiriti 
 
  
18 At 20. 
19 Magaret Mutu, above n 5 at 26, quoted in Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 454. 
20 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 24. 
21 Moana Jackson “Brief of Evidence” (Wai 1040 Doc D2, Waitangi Tribunal, 2010) at 13 in Waitangi 
Tribunal, above n 1, at 454. 
22 At 13 in Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 454. 
23 Anne Salmond “Brief of Evidence” (Wai 1040, Doc A22, Waitangi Tribunal, 2010) at 24-25 in Waitangi 
Tribunal, above n 1, at 461. 
24 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 514. 
25 Magaret Mutu, above n 5 at 26, in Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 454. 
26 Above n 5 at 26, in Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 454. 
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The second reason why the treaty was not a cession of sovereignty is that it would not 
have made sense in the political context of 1840. In pre-colonial Māori society, hapū 
were the primary unit of political organisation. Hapū had rights over land, natural 
resources such as fishing beds, and assets such as whare tūpuna (meeting houses) and 
waka.27 Hapū were led by rangatira, who coordinated communal activities, mediated 
disputes, facilitated decision making, allocated land, entered into diplomatic relationships 
with other hapū, and led military efforts.28 The mana embodied by rangatira belonged to 
their ancestors, and could grow or shrink depending on the rangatira’s capabilities as a 
leader. The status of rangatira had to be earned, and could be lost if the rangatira was no 
longer supported by the hapū.29 
 
Hapū had extensive trading and diplomatic relationships with each other, and these 
expanded to include Europeans from the late 18th century. Ngāpuhi’s diplomatic 
relationship with the British crown began with Tuki and Huru’s stay with Governor King 
in Norfolk Island in 1793,30 Te Pahi’s visit to him in Sydney in 1805,31 and Maatara’s 
visit to London in 1807, when he met the royal family.32 In 1820, Hongi Hika and 
Waikato went to England to work on a Māori language dictionary and to visit the King. 
The meeting that they had with King George IV was a diplomatic one. They had a 
friendly discussion, and Hongi and Waikato were presented with gifts. Hongi understood 
this meeting to be a meeting of equals.33 He felt that it established a personal diplomatic 
relationship between himself and the King.34  
 
Ngāpuhi had a long tradition of hosting rangatira representing hapū from throughout the 
land for the purposes of building alliances. According to Ngāpuhi oral tradition, an 
assembly or alliance called te Whakaminenga began meeting in 1808, as a forum to bring 
hapū together to discuss relationships with Europeans. Meetings were hosted by different 
Ngāpuhi hapū in order to share the burden. Over time, an increasing number of hapū 
joined. Te Whakaminenga was a new form of political authority, which operated 
alongside the authority of iwi and hapū.35 
  
27 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 30.  
28 At 30.  
29 At 31. 
30 At 69-70. 
31 At 72-75. 
32 At 76. 
33 At 96-99. 
34 At 106. 
35 At 153; 176-179. 
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In 1831, frustrated with increasing Pākehā lawlessness and breaking of tikanga, the 
rangatira of te Whakaminenga wrote a petition to King William IV. They noted the 
positive trading relationship that they had with Pākehā, but expressed concern about 
Pākehā troublemakers. They asked King William to become a friend and guardian, and to 
control the Pākehā.36 The response to this letter came with James Busby in 1833, who 
became the official British Resident.37 Ngāpuhi understood his role to be about 
controlling Pākehā lawlessness, as they had requested.38  
 
In 1830, a ship built in New Zealand was seized in Port Jackson (Sydney) because it was 
not registered. This caused concerned to northern rangatira.39 In response, Busby 
presented three flags to a hui of rangatira.40 The flag that was chosen on 20 March 1834 
is known as “Te Kare” or “The flag of Te Whakaminenga”.41 It was recognised by the 
British King in December 1834.42 It was also recognised in Australia, America, Canada 
and France.43 Patu Hohepa, in his evidence, stated that the recognition of the flag was an 
important “step in the recognition of Māori mana motuhake or tino rangatiratanga or 
sovereignty as defined explicitly in Māori terms”.44 Busby described the King’s approval 
as an acknowledgement of “the Sovereignty of the Chiefs of New Zealand in their 
collective capacity.”45 
 
The next important step in the relationship between Ngāpuhi rangatira and the Crown was 
he Whakaputanga, the English version of which is called the Declaration of 
Independence.46 Busby’s intention for the Declaration was to establish a national 
congress of rangatira who would make laws for all Māori, and to then use this congress to 
increase Britian’s authority and control.47 His other immediate motivation for Busby was 
  
36 At 114-115.  
37 At 123-124. 
38 Healy, Huygens and Murphy, above n 11, at 71.  
39 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 128-129. 
40 At 129. 
41 Healy, Huygens and Murphy, above n 11, at 56. 
42 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 133. 
43 Healy, Huygens and Murphy, above n 11 at 55-56.  
44 Patu Hohepa “Linguistic Evidence” (Wai 1040 Doc D4, Waitangi Tribunal, 2010) at [82] in Healy, 
Huygens and Murphy, above n 11, at 56.  
45 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 133. 
46 Note that the original document is spelt without an “h” in the name, because this is how the “wh” sound 
was written at the time. See Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 11. 
47 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 157; 499-500. 
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to mitigate the threat from the French baron, De Thierry, who had claimed sovereignty in 
the Hokianga.48 The rangatira, on the other hand, wanted the benefits of European 
technology, ideas and relationships, while ensuring that the rangatira maintained control 
and the newcomers complied with tikanga.49  
 
Busby wrote a draft Declaration in English, which was translated into Māori by Henry 
Williams. Busby took this Māori draft to te Whakaminenga, who spent two days debating 
and re-crafting the text. 50  This document, he Whakaputanga. was signed by 34 rangatira 
on 28 October, and another 18 in the next four years.51 The Tribunal found that because 
“only he Whakaputanga was debated, and only he Whakaputanga was signed … the 
Māori text must be seen as authoritative.”52  
 
In he Whakaputanga, the rangatira of te Whakaminenga declared their “rangatiranga o to 
matou wenua”, that is, sovereignty or absolute power in their lands. They declared that 
the kingitanga and mana of their land resided with them, and that no-one else could frame 
laws, and no governor could be established, unless appointed by te Whakaminenga. They 
agreed to meet at Waitangi in the autumn of each year to make laws (“ture”) that would 
apply to Europeans and to relationships between Māori and Europeans, and they asked 
the King for protection.53 
 
The English text expresses Busby’s intention to create a centralised law-making body that 
would have exclusive capacity to make laws, but this was not agreed to in the Māori text, 
which only excludes the law-making power of foreigners.54 The Tribunal found that there 
was no intention of the rangatira to give up the mana and rangatiratanga they exercised on 
whanau, hapū, and iwi levels, and there was no intention to create the supreme legislature 
that Busby envisaged.55 Indeed, this would have been impossible, as they explained to 
Busby at the time.56 Rather, te Whakaminenga was an additional form of authority, which 
  
48 At at 159-160; 499-500. 
49  At 157. 
50 At 163- 165. 
51 At 154. 
52 At 199. 
53 At 171-183; 500-502. 
54 At 182; 500. 
55 At 201; 499-500.  
56 At 501.  
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existed alongside, and did not undermine, the authority that already existed.57 The 
Declaration was officially acknowledged by Britain on 25 May 1836.58 
 
He Whakaputanga, the Tribunal concluded:59 
 
… was an unambiguous declaration that hapū and rangatira authority continued in 
force – as, on the ground, it undoubtedly did – and that Britain had a role in making 
sure that state of affairs continued as Māori contact with foreigners increased. 
 
He Whakaputanga foreshadowed the possibility of Te Whakaminenga delegating some of 
its authority in the future. Te Tiriti is therefore intrinsically linked to he Whakaputanga. It 
builds on rather than replaces it.60 By 1840, even though there were only about 2000 
Pākehā residing in New Zealand, Māori were growing increasingly frustrated with their 
disrespect for tikanga. The rangatira felt that it was not a good use of their time to have to 
deal with the lawless Pākehā, so they decided to delegate this responsibility to the 
Crown.61 For Māori, the treaty was a strategic alliance, which build on the relationship 
that had been developing since at least 1820.62 
 
The Crown’s motivations were somewhat different. The British Crown was initially 
reluctant to formally colonise New Zealand, although this changed in the late 1830s.63 
Busby’s dispatch in June 1837, which exaggerated the lawlessness of British settlers and 
their impact on Māori, contributed to this change in policy.64 The other main element was 
The New Zealand Company’s plans for private colonisation.65 Hobson was sent to New 
Zealand with instructions from Lord Normanby to acquire sovereignty. The insturctions 
acknowledged the sovereignty of the rangatira and required him to acquire their “free and 
intelligent consent” before claiming sovereignty.66 
 
  
57 At 501-502 
58 At 184-185. 
59 At 502.  
60 Healy, Huygens and Murphy, above n 11, at 148-149 and 188-192.  
61 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 524. 
62 At 525. 
63 At 505. 
64 At 505. 
65 At 505-506. 
66 At 316-317. 
14  
 
The events leading up to 1840, and in particular he Whakaputanga, illustrate that hapū 
were strong, independent and flourishing. They were engaging with the British on their 
own terms and for their own purposes, in ways that strengthened their mana and 
authority. The text of the treaty, discussed in the next section, must be understood in light 
of this history.  
 
C Meaning of the Text and Oral Discussions 
 
In this Section, I discuss the meaning of te Tiriti as it was understood by its signatories. 
The Ngāpuhi claimants stressed that te Tiriti must be understood as a whole document, 
and emphasised its overall intent and meaning.67 As I will outline, the overall meaning of 
the English text was that Māori would cede sovereignty, and their property rights would 
be protected. The overall meaning of the Māori text was to retain mana and 
rangatiratanga, while establishing that a Governor would govern Pākehā. I expand on 
these meanings and the differences between them in this Section.   
 
Hobson arrived in the Bay of Islands on 29 January 1840 with Lord Normanby’s 
instructions and draft notes for a treaty. He sent these notes to Busby, who made some 
amendments, notably to art 2. Hobson then sent the draft to missionary Henry Williams 
for translation. Williams was assisted by his son, Edward, in this task.68 Williams 
translated the text into Māori overnight, and was aware of the difficulties in doing so.69 
On 5 February, te Tiriti was presented to the rangatira and it was debated – which I 
discuss in more depth below. Te Tiriti was signed by 43 rangatira and by Hobson on 6 
February and subsequently around the country, bringing the total number of signatories to 
around 500.70 
 
The English text was not discussed at Waitangi or at most of the other signings around 
the country, and nor was its content debated.71 The version which is known as “the 
English text”72 was sent to Henry Maunsell, a missionary, for signings at Waikato Heads 
and Manukau. He was the only person sent this text rather than te Tiriti for signing. Ani 
Mikaere writes that the reason for this has never been adequately explained, but it was 
  
67 At 452. 
68 At 342-344. 
69 At 512. 
70 At 388. 
71 At 515-519. 
72 It is set out as such in Schedule 1 to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
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probably an error.73 The English text was signed by 32 rangatira at Waikato Heads, and a 
further seven at Manukau. It is important to note that they signed on the basis of oral 
discussions in Māori, which did not convey the meaning of the English text.74  
 
The English text contains a cession of sovereignty in art 1. Article 2 is a guarantee of 
property rights and gives the crown pre-emption (the exclusive right to buy land). Article 
3 gives Māori the rights and privileges of British subjects. The Tribunal found that it was 
clear from this text that Hobson intended for Māori to cede their sovereignty to the 
Crown.75  
 
All of the Ngāpuhi claimants dismissed the English text as irrelevant, because it was 
neither understood nor signed by their tūpuna (ancestors). They argued that te Tiriti and 
the English text were completely different documents.76 The Tribunal felt that because of 
its empowering legislation, that they were “bound to regard the treaty as comprising two 
texts.” This illustrates the limitations of using Tribunal reports as a source of history. It 
did, however, add that:77 
 
We consider that, once we have considered the English text with an open mind, we 
are under no obligation to find some sort of middle ground and meaning between the 
two versions. 
 
The Tribunal added that the Māori text should be given “special weight … in establishing 
the treaty’s meaning and effect” because it was the text that was signed and understood 
by the rangatira. They also stated that “in the case of any ambiguity between the two 
texts”, “significant weight” should be placed on the Māori text.78 This emphasis on the 
Māori text is evident in the Tribunal’s overall finding that the treaty was not a cession of 
sovereignty. 
 
The Tribunal drew on six modern back-translations of te Tiriti,79 although it did not set 
these out in its report. Each approaches the translation from a slightly different angle. The 
precise nuances of each translation are not the focus of this essay, so I have chosen one of 
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75 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 509. 
76 At 452-455; 503. 
77 At 522.  
78 At 522. 
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them to convey a general understanding of what te Tiriti meant to Ngāpuhi in 1840. The 
one that I quote below is Manuka Henare’s, reproduced from Ngapuhi Speaks. It comes 
from his brief of evidence to the Tribunal, which is based on his 2003 PhD thesis. This is 
a “historical-semantic” translation, meaning that it attempts to capture the meaning that 
the text had to the rangatira at the time.  
 
Henare translated art 1 of te Tiriti as follows:80 
 
The chiefs of the Confederation and also all the Chiefs who have not yet entered into 
that confederation, give completely (tuku rawa atu) to the Queen of England for ever 
all the Governorship [kawanatanga] of their lands. 
 
Ngāpuhi scholars emphasised the understanding that their tūpuna had of “kāwanatanga”. 
Patu Hohepa pointed out that it meant governorship in the sense that “the governor will 
govern Pakeha people … and any lands obtained by or given to the Queen” rather than 
“governing through government”.81 The Tribunal agreed with this view, concluding that 
“the rangatira understood kāwanatanga primarily as the power to control settlers and 
thereby keep the peace and protect Māori interests accordingly.”82 It also found that “few 
if any rangatira would have envisaged the Governor having authority to intervene in 
internal Māori affairs,”83 and that the rangatira “did not agree that the Governor should 
have ultimate authority.”84 
 
The reason for Williams’ translation of “sovereignty” in art 1 to “kāwanatanga” is central 
to debates about the treaty. A few historians have argued that “kāwanatanga” was an 
appropriate translation, because “kāwanatanga” equated to civil government, which 
equates to sovereignty.85 Many more historians argue that “mana” would have been a 
more accurate translation of Hobson’s intentions, but would never have been agreed to by 
the rangatira.86 The Ngāpuhi claimants similarly argued that “mana, kīngitanga or 
rangatiratanga would have been more accurate translations of sovereignty, and that no 
  
80 Manuka Henare “Brief of Evidence” (Wai 1040 Doc B3, Waitangi Tribunal 2010) at [368] in Healy, 
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81 Hohepa, above n 44 at 52-53 in Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 454-455. 
82 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 523. 
83 At 523. 
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chief would have ceded these.”87 The Tribunal agreed with this view, stating that “a 
straightforward explanation of sovereignty could not have avoided the use of the word 
‘mana’”, because Williams himself had used mana, rangatiratanga and kīngitanga in he 
Whakaputanga to express the highest level of authority and independence, which “is the 
essence of sovereignty.”88 Further, ceding mana or rangatiratanga would have been 
impossible in Māori law.89 
 
There are two sentences in the art 2. Henare translates the first as:90 
 
The Queen of England will put in place (wakarite) and agrees (wakaae) that the 
Chiefs, the tribes, and all the People of New Zealand, have full (absolute) authority 
and power [te tino rangatiratanga] of their lands, their settlements and surrounding 
environs (kainga), and all their valuables (property) (taonga). 
 
As mentioned above, te tino rangatiratanga encompasses but is broader than sovereignty. 
According to Mutu, “it includes aspects of the English notions of ownership, status, 
influence, dignity, respect and sovereignty, and has strong spiritual connotations.”91 The 
first part of art 2, therefore, is an explicit recognition and strengthening of the sovereign 
power and authority of Māori. The Tribunal broadly agreed with the claimants’ views on 
this, concluding that art 2 meant that “rangatira would retain their independence and 
authority as rangatira, and would be the Governor’s equal”.92 
 
Some of the claimants argued that the kāwanatanga of the Crown was subject to the 
authority of the rangatira, while others agued that the Crown’s authority would be equal – 
the Crown would control Pākeha, and the Crown and the rangatira would act jointly in 
relation to interactions or disputes between Māori and Pākehā.93 The Tribunal 
acknowledged that this difference of opinion was not surprising, and reflected the 
different intentions and motivations of the rangatira in 1840. In any case, the Tribunal 
found that “few if any rangatira would have envisaged the Governor having authority to 
intervene in internal Māori affairs”, and that issues involving both Māori and Pākehā 
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would be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.94 It was clear that the signatories understood 
that Hobson would be a Governor for Pākehā and not for Māori.95 
 
Williams’ motivation in using the term “rangatiratanga” in art 2, has also been the subject 
of intense debate. Historians have written that the mistranslation was deliberately 
deceitful re-writing of the treaty in order to persuade Māori to sign; a creative 
reworking.96 Others have suggested that Williams did understand the term to be akin to 
possession of land and other property, so was not deliberately deceitful in his 
translation.97 The Tribunal rejected this last suggestion, because “rangatiratanga” had 
been used for “kingdom” in the Bible, and Williams himself had used “rangatiratanga” to 
denote “independence” in he Whakaputanga.98 In addition, it was used shortly after the 
treaty was signed by the British to express the sovereignty that they themselves had 
claimed.99  
 
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that:100 
 
While Williams may have been honest in his choice of ‘kawanatanga’ to translate 
‘sovereignty’, he must, however, have known that tino rangatiratanga conveyed 
more than what was set out in the English text. 
 
The Tribunal further found that Williams changed the meaning because he “understood 
what it would take to convince Māori to sign”.101 That is, the mistranslation was 
deliberate. 
 
The second part of the article is an agreement to sell land to the Queen. In the Māori text, 
this is not a monopoly right.102 
 
Henare’s translation of art 3 states:103 
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In recognition of this agreement to the Governorship of the queen, the queen of 
England will protect (tiaki) all the Māori people of New Zealand and offers (tukua) 
all the same English customary rights (tikanga) she offers her people of England. 
 
This is controversial to the extent that it is unclear whether it imposes obligations as well 
as conferring benefits and entitlements. If it imposes obligations, then it is inconsistent 
with rangatiratanga in art 2.104  
 
The oral discussions support the interpretations discussed above. The Tribunal 
summarised Hobson’s message as “Give me the authority to protect you and control the 
settlers.”105 Hobson’s explanations in English suggested that signing the treaty was a 
technicality, which would not impact on their rights or independence.106 Williams’ 
explanations in Māori focused on the treaty being an act of protection, which would, 
according to the Tribunal, “preserve their property, rights and privileges” and safeguard 
them from France.107 The Tribunal found that neither Hobson nor Williams conveyed the 
concept of ceding sovereignty, or that English law would apply to Māori. In fact, Hobson 
gave numerous assurances to the rangatira that their authority would be protected.108 
 
The recorded speeches of the rangatira focused on whether there would be a Governor, 
and how much power he would have. Some of the rangatira expressed concern that the 
Governor would be “above” them, which the Crown argued meant that they consented to 
the Governor’s supremacy.109 The Tribunal rejected this, pointing out that the purpose of 
such speeches was to get Williams to clarify that this was not the case.110 The oral 
statements of Williams and the other missionaries assured the rangatira that the Governor 
would not have power over Māori and must be understood as part of the agreement.111 
 
In relation to the oral discussions, the Tribunal concluded:112 
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It is clear that the rangatira did not agree that the Governor should have ultimate 
authority. Rather, many explicitly sought assurances that they and the Governor 
would be equals, and appear to have signed te Tiriti only on that basis.  
 
The Tribunal found that there was a common agreement reached in the treaty. It found 
that the treaty’s “meaning and effect came from the Māori text, on the one hand, and the 
verbal explanations and assurances given by Hobson and the missionaries, on the 
other.”113 This was because the oral agreement and the written Māori text were 
substantially similar, which shows that the two sides did in fact agree. 
 
The Māori text and accompanying speeches make sense in light of Māori law and history 
discussed in the previous Section. The Tribunal found that the rangatira understood that 
the Governor would have “the power to control British subjects and thereby keep the 
peace and protect Māori”,114 which is what Māori desired, as explained above. Hobson 
“would be the Pākehā rangatira in an alliance that had been developing for decades 
between Bay of Islands and Hokianga rangatira and the Crown.”115 It was a strategic 
alliance and diplomatic relationship, that built on the meeting with King George IV, the 
petition to King William IV, and he Whakaputanga.116 
 
D Aftermath – How Did the Crown Acquire Sovereignty? 
 
The Tribunal’s report focused only on the meaning and intent of the treaty in 1840; and 
not on subsequent breaches of it – which will be the focus of its Stage 2 report. However, 
for my purposes it is necessary to ask – if sovereignty was not acquired as a result of 
Māori voluntarily ceding it through the treaty, then how was it acquired? I do not intend 
to undertake a detailed analysis here, but it is necessary to point out that given that British 
sovereignty was not consented to, it must have been established by another means. 
Sovereignty was actually imposed through the violent process of colonisation. 
 
On the 21 May 1840 Hobson proclaimed sovereignty over New Zealand on the basis of 
cession of the North Island and discovery of the South Island.117 The proclamation 
ignored even the English text. At this point only some of the treaty sheets had been 
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returned to Hobson.118 After some major southern rangatira had signed, sovereignty over 
the South Island was proclaimed on the basis of cession.119 In addition, since some hapū 
refused to sign and some never had the opportunity, Hobson cannot possibly have 
thought that he had achieved the general “free consent” that he had been instructed to 
obtain. As the Tribunal pointed out, according to English law, “Britain acquired 
sovereignty when it said it had.”120 
 
However, this did not mean that the Crown actually exercised sovereign power in 1840. 
The population in 1840 was around somewhere between 90,000-100,000 Māori to 2,000 
Pākehā,121 and the Crown could not have taken the country by force at that time. Rather, 
it was over the next several decades that the Crown asserted its sovereignty through 
various violent means.122 James Belich has described the military invasions of the 1860s 
as the Crown’s way of imposing “substantive” rather than “nominal” sovereignty.123 Vast 
amounts of land were alienated through the Native Land Court, meaning that by 1891 
Māori retained only about 40 per cent of land.124 Introduced disease had a significant 
impact in shifting the population balance:125 by 1901, Māori made up just 5.5 per cent of 
the population.126  
 
As Jackson has pointed out, these forms of physical violence were accompanied by the 
imposition of institutions, laws and values, and an attack “on the indigenous soul”.127 Of 
course, Māori were by no means passive in this history: in fact many Māori have resisted 
both the Crown’s violence and the Crown’s sovereignty.128  
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In this Part, I have discussed why the treaty was not a cession of sovereignty. Māori law 
made it impossible to cede sovereignty; it would have not made sense to do so in the 
political context of 1840; and sovereignty was expressly preserved in both te Tiriti and in 
the oral discussions. Those who signed the English text did so on the basis of their 
understanding of the Māori text. A large body of existing historical research supported 
the Tribunal’s decision. However, public law textbooks have not caught up with these 
developments. I turn to these texts in Part IV.  In the next Part, however, I introduce these 
textbooks and outline the concept of textbooks as a subject of scholarly critique. 
 
III Public Law Textbooks as a Subject of Critique 
 
In this Part, I introduce the idea of public law textbooks as a subject of scholarly critique. 
I have chosen to analyse general public law texts, rather than works focusing on the 
treaty, because it is my view that general works about constitutional law are a useful 
means of examining the portrayal of the treaty in Pākehā constitutional discourse more 
broadly. Discussing the entirety of this mainstream constitutional law scholarship would 
be an enormous task, which is why I have chosen textbooks as my focus. In this Part, I 
introduce the three textbooks and their intended audience, and outline the value of using 
textbooks as the subject of critical legal analysis.  
 
A Introduction to the Public Law Textbooks 
 
In this section, I briefly introduce the books I have chosen: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, Bridled Power and Law Alive. My intention in this paper is not to 
criticise the particular authors – I am more interested in the similarities between these 
texts than their differences; and I am interested in what they suggest about the state of 
Pākehā constitutional discourse. Nor is my project to contextualise each textbook within 
the historical or political context of its writing, the life it its author(s), or the authors’ 
other work. It is interesting to note in passing, however, that each of these authors have 
also written specifically about the treaty.129 
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Constitutional and Administrative Law was last published in 2014. It is certainly the 
longest and most comprehensive of the three books, at 1466 pages. It “is used extensively 
in the law schools, is a primary resource for central government and is regularly cited in 
the judgments of the courts”,130 according to its back cover; and no doubt this claim is 
accurate, due to its comprehensive nature. 
 
Bridled Power is the oldest of the three texts, having been last updated in 2004. Bridled 
Power says it “will be of value to anyone interested in government, as well as to judges, 
law practitioners, academics, government departments and politicians, and law and 
political science students”.131 This broad audience is reflected in the author’s desire to 
“offer a stimulus to public debate”.132 The book intends to be “practical … but with a 
critical and reformist approach”.133 This perhaps explains its focus on contemporary 
issues – as will be discussed below, it engages in historical accounts far less than the 
other two books. 
 
Law Alive is not a public law text as such, but rather an introductory text on the New 
Zealand legal system as a whole (although about half of the topics covered by the book 
could be classified as public law). It is intended for first year law students.134 The most 
recent edition was published in 2015. Unlike the other books, one of its goals is to 
provide a contextual account of the legal system.135 This means it has more of an 
interdisciplinary approach than many law textbooks.  
 
Although each textbook has a different audience, between them their audience is very 
broad – from the general public, to law students, to practitioners. This underpins the 
influential role they have, which I turn to in the following Section. 
B Textbooks as a Subject of Critique 
 
In this Section, I argue that the purpose and function of legal textbooks, which is to be 
comprehensive and neutral sources on a given area of law, means that the choices made 
by textbook authors have a direct impact on the reader’s understanding of the subject 
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matter. These choices are in fact normative, and help to construct the law as well as 
reflect it. However, the values and assumptions underpinning a textbook are often not 
acknowledged by the authors themselves. 
 
Although textbooks are not a particularly common subject of critique by legal scholars, 
some critical analysis of textbooks does exist. Textbooks covering substantive areas like 
contract,136 torts,137 and criminal law138 have been critically analysed. Within public law, 
such analysis has tended to focus on administrative rather than constitutional law.139  
 
Textbooks, by definition, aim to provide “a coherent, relatively comprehensive synthesis” 
of a particular area of law.140 Textbooks, in general, claim to be both comprehensive and 
neutral. There is a general distinction between them, and books which are not textbooks: 
the latter have a specific focus, and tend to argue a particular view. There are, of course, 
some books which do both.141  
 
Legal textbooks have an influential role because of their wide audience.142 I have 
discussed above the audience of each of the public law textbooks – which, between them, 
is wide-ranging. Textbooks are also influential because they are thought to be 
authoritative. Unlike works with a specific focus, textbooks are used as a point of 
reference by anyone who wants to understand the subject matter in general terms.143 
Joseph’s textbook claims to be “the authoritative text on public law in New Zealand”,144 
and given that it is the most comprehensive text on New Zealand public law, this is a 
reasonable claim.  
  
136 Mary Joe Frug “Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook” (1985) 34 Am U 
L Rev 1065. 
137 Carl Tobias “Gender issues and the Prosser, Wade and Schwartz Torts Casebook” (1988) 18 Golden 
Gate U L Rev 495. 
138 Mary Irene Coombs “Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law 
Textbook” (1988) 38 J Legal Educ 117. 
139 See, for example, Michael Taggart “Prolegomenon to an Intellectual History of Administrative Law in 
the Twentieth Century: the Case of John Willis and Canadian Administrative Law” (2005) 43 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 223; Peter Leyland and Terry Woods “From homogeneity to pluralism: The textbook revisited” 
(1999) 33(1) The Law Teacher 18; D J Galligan “Judicial Review and the Textbook Writers” (1982) 2 
Oxford J Legal Stud 257. 
140 Coombs, above n 138, at 119-120.  
141 At 121. 
142 Taggart, above n 139, at 235-236. 
143 Coombs, above n 138, at 121. 
144 Joseph, above n 6, back cover. 
25  
 
 
Textbook authors must, by necessity, make difficult choices as to what content to include 
and what to omit. Textbooks cannot be expected to cover every topic from every 
perspective; however, the difficulty of synthesising large amounts of information does 
not in itself make the author immune from criticism. Authors make decisions about what 
material to include, exclude or de-emphasise, guided by their own view of what is 
important. 145 
 
In Taggart’s context of administrative law text in the 1960s and 1970s, he noted that the 
textbooks were insular and resistant to looking outside the law or to interdisciplinary 
approaches.146 In my view, many legal textbooks remain narrow in their approach; 
focused on purely legal scholarship at the expense of contributions from other disciplines; 
and even then focused on orthodox legal writing rather than critical contributions from 
within the legal discipline. This is certainly evident in the public law textbooks’ treatment 
of the treaty, which overlook several decades of historical research as well as 
interdisciplinary work within legal scholarship. This is discussed further in the next Part. 
 
Rosemary Hunter writes that it is a product of choice for an author to ignore an entire 
body of critical work in a particular area.147 In her context of labour law textbooks, “the 
endorsement of the dominant paradigm renders [the textbook authors] complicit in the 
entrenchment of women workers’ legal invisibility”148 That is, if authors choose to ignore 
critical work in a field and only engage with writing that fits within the dominant 
paradigm, then they are playing a role in continuing to marginalise those who are 
overlooked, marginalised or oppressed by that paradigm. This is because these choices 
then play an important role in how readers think about that area of law.149 
 
All of this means that textbooks, while claiming to be neutral, do in fact have an 
important normative role. Because textbooks are assumed to be a neutral statement of the 
law as it is and are consulted for this purpose, they are not only reflective of an area of 
law; they also help to constitute it.150 This means that textbooks have an important role in 
shaping the paradigms in which a discipline is understood. These paradigms are 
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internalised by students, or others, relying on the textbook as their source of 
information.151  
 
This is particularly the case in the context of constitutional law, because constitutions, 
especially unwritten ones, are constructed – at least in part – by those who write about 
them. Public law textbooks have a particular role in shaping the paradigms and discourses 
of constitutionalism. This means that their treatment of the treaty directly influences the 
reader’s understanding of the treaty’s meaning and role in both existing and future 
constitutional arrangements. 
 
Finally, critical analysis of textbooks allows the possibility of articulating assumptions 
and myths that the books are based on. Coombs argues that uncovering assumptions can 
reveal views that are “often so deeply embedded that they are felt as ‘natural’ and are 
thus included in such ‘objective’ texts almost inadvertently.”152 By bringing these 
assumptions to the surface, they can be properly engaged with and critiqued. Taggart 
writes that “legal study and the practice of law are particularly susceptible to the 
perpetuation of myths.”153 In my view, this is especially true in the area of constitutional 
law.  
 
I have defined textbooks as books that readers presume to be both comprehensive and 
neutral. Because of this function, they have particular influence and authority. Textbook 
authors must make choices about what content to include, and these choices can reinforce 
dominant paradigms or challenge them. The choices the authors make will directly 
impact the reader’s impression of the subject matter. This means that textbooks have an 
important normative role in actually constructing the subject matter. Textbooks also 
include unacknowledged assumptions and myths, which – when articulated – can be 
critiqued. I turn to the assumptions and myths of the treaty content of three public law 
textbooks in the next Part.  
 
IV The Textbooks 
 
In this Part, I discuss the three textbooks and their portrayal of the treaty. Each author 
either states or strongly implies that the treaty was, or purported to be, a voluntary cession 
of sovereignty. This claim relies on, first, a lack of engagement with Māori history, law 
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and context, which, as outlined in Part II, shows that a cession of sovereignty would have 
been impossible. Secondly, the idea that the treaty ceded sovereignty relies on 
downplaying the differences between the texts and assuming that the English text is “the” 
treaty.  
A The Myth that the Treaty Was a Cession of Sovereignty 
 
All three of the texts express the idea that that “the treaty”, as in the document signed on 
6 February 1840 and subsequently, was a cession of sovereignty by Māori to the Crown. 
Each author has a slightly different approach to this point. Joseph writes that the Treaty 
purported to be a treaty of cession, but was not one, because Māori lacked the legal 
capacity to enter such treaties. Palmer and Palmer suggest that it was a treaty of cession, 
without making the claim explicitly. Morris suggests explicitly that the treaty was a 
cession of sovereignty. These are discussed in turn. 
 
Joseph argues that although “[t]he Treaty purported to cede to the British Crown 
territorial sovereignty over New Zealand”,154 it was not actually a treaty of cession. This 
is because he doubts whether “Maori tribal society possessed ‘statehood’ for cession of 
sovereignty.”155 He dedicates seven pages to the question of whether Māori had the 
capacity to cede sovereignty according to the international law of the time. He begins by 
listing the requirements for a treaty of cession.156 He then sets out the “orthodox view” 
that Māori did not possess the requisite statehood, meaning that the treaty was not one of 
cession according to international law.157 To support this view, Joseph primarily cites 
works published in the 1950s and 1960s158  – and an “authoritative work” from 1926.159  
 
Joseph then turns to the “contrary view”, which is that Māori did have international 
capacity and therefore were able to, and did, cede sovereignty. He cites the works of 
Kenneth Keith, Paul McHugh and Ian Brownlie, which were published between 1990 and 
1992.160 Ultimately, however, he rejects this view, preferring the view that New Zealand 
was legally claimed on the basis of occupation and settlement, not cession.161 This is 
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because, he argues, although the treaty purported to cede sovereignty, Māori did not 
possess the requisite statehood to do so.162 
 
Palmer and Palmer do not have such a clear view. In the first paragraph of their treaty 
chapter, they write that “the Treaty symbolises rights and obligations of Māori and the 
undertakings that were given to them when the Crown assumed authority.”163 They go on 
to state that “[i]n one sense, New Zealand’s right as a nation to make laws, to govern, and 
to dispense justice can be said to spring from that 1840 compact between the Crown and 
the Maori.”164 It is possible that these quotes could be interpreted to mean that the treaty 
was not a cession of sovereignty. The words “in one sense” and “spring from” could 
suggest that the treaty itself was not a cession of sovereignty – and it is possible that the 
authors deliberately chose these words to distance the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty 
from the treaty itself. 
 
However, in my view, this is not the effect of Palmer and Palmer’s choice of words. First, 
they do not discuss any other potential sources of the Government’s power to make laws, 
govern and dispense justice. Secondly, even if the sovereignty of the Crown is something 
that “springs from” the treaty rather than directly resulting from it, this still suggests that 
the treaty was a cession of sovereignty. The absolute sovereignty currently assumed by 
the Crown cannot credibly be derived from a document that preserved the tino 
rangatiratanga, or sovereignty, of Māori while allowing for a Governor for Pākehā. It can 
only be derived from the treaty if it is assumed that the treaty was a cession of 
sovereignty. 
 
In Law Alive, the myth of cession pervades the entire chapter. Morris writes that Māori 
and the Crown signed a treaty in 1840 “transforming New Zealand into a British 
colony,”165 which suggests that the treaty itself had the effect of Britain acquiring 
sovereignty. In discussing reasons for the treaty signing, Morris writes that “the 1835 
Declaration of Independence also posed a problem for the British Crown” and that “it 
was necessary for Britain to recognise the declaration in the treaty and then nullify its 
provisions through the cession of sovereignty in Article 1.”166 Notably, he is the only 
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author to mention the Declaration at all. This is followed by an acknowledgement that 
sovereignty might not have been ceded:167 
 
If sovereignty was indeed ceded through Article 1, then the declaration no longer has 
direct relevance to the New Zealand legal system. If only governorship was ceded, 
then any sovereignty established by the declaration could still conceivably exist. 
 
This suggestion that the treaty might not have ceded sovereignty is an advance on the 
other authors’ understanding; but not particularly convincing in light of the rest of the 
chapter, which suggests, in more authoritative language, that the treaty did cede 
sovereignty. 
 
The treaty is also described as a cession of sovereignty elsewhere in the book. In the legal 
history chapter, Morris writes that “several constitutional measures” were taken from 
1839 onwards to “confirm British sovereignty over New Zealand, independently of the 
treaty.”168 Morris states that a proclamation dated 14 January 1840, which extended the 
boundaries of New South Wales to include New Zealand, “preceded the events at 
Waitangi by several weeks, but in effect was contingent on Māori ceding sovereignty 
through the treaty.”169 This passage suggests that while Morris disclaims the treaty as the 
legal basis of sovereignty, he does portray it as a necessary step – at least in moral or 
political terms – for Britain to acquire sovereignty by proclamation. It also, once again, is 
a clear statement of Morris’s view that the treaty was a cession of sovereignty.  
 
All three of the textbooks portray the idea that the treaty was (or purported to be) a 
cession of sovereignty. Although “legal” sovereignty is said to be acquired by other 
means, the treaty is portrayed as a necessary step and as a signal of Māori consent to that 
sovereignty. This is either explicit, in the case of Joseph and Morris, or implicit, in the 
case of Palmer and Palmer.  The myth that the treaty was a cession of sovereignty is 
bolstered by focusing only on British/Pākehā history, law and motivations, and focusing 
on the English text, while downplaying the differences between that text and te Tiriti. 
These are discussed in the following two sections. 
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B Failure to Engage with Māori History, Law and Motivations 
 
One of the two main elements supporting the narrative that the treaty was a cession of 
sovereignty is a failure to engage with Māori history, law, and motivations for signing te 
Tiriti. As outlined in Part II, in Māori law it was impossible to give up mana or 
rangatiratanga, so Māori could not have intended to give up their sovereignty when they 
signed te Tiriti. In addition, the political context of the time suggests that Māori wanted to 
strengthen their relationship with the British, and have a governor to control Pākehā – not 
give up their autonomy to a foreign ruler. The claim that the treaty was a voluntary 
cession of sovereignty is therefore directly linked to this overlooking of Māori history, 
law and motivations.  
 
Each of the authors takes a slightly different approach to this: Joseph explores British 
motivations in depth but makes no mention of Māori motivations; Palmer and Palmer 
have no history or context of either side; and Morris does have some limited discussion of 
Māori motivations and Māori law.  
 
Joseph discusses British historical context at length in the chapter “Establishment of 
British Rule”.170 He describes Britain as a “reluctant colonising power” who “succumbed 
finally to increasing pressure to acquire New Zealand.”171 The requirement in 
Normanby’s instructions to acquire the “free and intelligent consent of the natives” was, 
quoting historian Keith Sinclair, “a new and noble beginning in British colonial 
policy”,172 that, in Joseph’s words “distinguished the history of New Zealand from that of 
earlier settlement colonies”.173    
 
Joseph then sets out the British history in and relating to New Zealand at length. He 
begins with Abel Tasman’s voyage in 1642 and James Cook’s in 1769. He then discusses 
the 1830s, where he describes Britain’s policy of “strict non-intervention” in New 
Zealand.174 He then mentions Britain’s legislative attempts at controlling its subjects and 
Busby’s appointment.175 He describes the increasing pressure on Britain to intervene: the 
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increasing European population, unchecked lawlessness and humanitarian concerns; the 
impending establishment of settlements by the New Zealand Company; and the threat of 
France annexing New Zealand. Normanby’s instructions are then set out, followed by a 
brief mention of the treaty (which is expanded on in the next chapter), Hobson’s May 
1840 proclamations, and the subsequent gazetting of these proclamations in London.176 
 
Notable by its absence in this discussion is any mention of Māori history, context or 
motivations for signing te Tiriti.  
 
Joseph also discusses extensively whether the treaty was one of cession according to 
international law, as already noted in the preceding Section. He does not discuss whether 
it was a treaty of cession according to Māori law.  
 
Bridled Power, perhaps unsurprisingly given how short the chapter is, does not discuss 
historical context at all, British or Māori. The brief section on constitutional history early 
in the book begins in 1840.177 In the treaty chapter, the only reference to historical 
context prior to the treaty is “Māori came to Aotearoa before Pakeha.”178 There is no 
discussion of the motivations for either side, and there is also no discussion of the legal 
status of the treaty in British/international law, or Māori law. Rather, the chapter is very 
focused on the  contemporary meaning and application of the treaty. 
 
In Law Alive, Māori law is mentioned very briefly in the legal history chapter, which 
acknowledges that “the English system dominated and effectively excluded the Māori 
system”179 and that from 1840, “Māori customary law, which had operated in New 
Zealand since the arrival of Polynesian voyagers approximately 700 years before, was 
swept aside.”180 These two quotes do at least acknowledge the existence of a Māori legal 
system, and suggest the aggressiveness with which English law dominated – although it 
the portrayal of the timeframe for this is not particularly accurate. 
 
Māori law is discussed in more depth later in the book, in the section on Māori dispute 
resolution. Morris writes that Māori had “a complex system of legal concepts and 
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regulations” which “is as much law as the English system.”181 Key concepts are defined, 
and there is a brief discussion about how some of them applied in pre-colonial Māori 
society. It is emphasised that Māori dispute resolution focuses on the collective rather 
than the individual.182 Apart from an acknowledgement that “Māori customary law was 
largely ignored by the colonists”183 there is no discussion of how Māori legal systems 
were violently displaced by colonisation.  
 
Most of the section focuses on contemporary applications of Māori dispute resolution. 
The possibility of a parallel system is discussed, in light of the over-representation of 
Māori in prisons. Morris notes that a parallel system “would fulfil the promise of te tino 
rangatiratanga in Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi, but could possibly undermine the 
idea of ‘one law for all’.”184 This is the only mention of the relationship between Māori 
law and the treaty. 
 
While Māori law is mentioned in the legal history chapter and the dispute resolution 
chapter, it is not mentioned at all in the chapter on the treaty. This means that the question 
of whether it was possible for Māori to cede sovereignty according to their own law is not 
addressed. 
 
Morris also fails to adequately address Māori reasons for signing te Tiriti. One of the 
objectives of the treaty chapter is that students should be able to “outline the main reasons 
why the treaty was signed (from both British and Māori perspectives)”.185 However, 
under the heading “How and Why was the Treaty Signed?” the focus is almost entirely on 
British motivations. Like Joseph, Morris begins with Britain’s reluctance to acquire New 
Zealand and then describes the factors that caused this to change. This includes 
humanitarian concerns, financial motivations, rivalry with France, and the land purchases 
of the New Zealand Company.186 The section also includes a mention of the Declaration 
of Independence, a “problem” which it was necessary to “nullify” by the treaty.187  
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The only discussion of Māori motivations is in the context of discussions on 5 February 
1840, as follows:188 
 
Arguments for and against the treaty were put forward by different chiefs. Some 
argued that the treaty would unnecessarily cede too much to the Crown. After all, 
Māori outnumbered Pākehā by approximately forty to one in 1840. Others argued 
that signing the treaty would allow Māori to call upon British protection and increase 
trade opportunities. A particularly convincing argument was made by Tāmati Wāka 
Nene. He argued that Britain was so powerful that its control of New Zealand was a 
foregone conclusion and that it was better to accept this act and work with it than to 
fight in vain against the inevitable. 
 
This is problematic, because apart from the reference to protection and trade 
opportunities, the rest of the quoted passage appears to describe motivations to sign a 
treaty of cession. This is not what the discussions were about, because the document put 
to Māori on 5 February, te Tiriti, was not a treaty of cession at all.  
 
Additionally, it is inaccurate to describe Nene’s argument as “particularly convincing”. 
The Tribunal has commented on his speech often being portrayed as representative. It 
commented that “it is a mistake to regard his intervention as decisive simply because 
Hobson (and other Pākehā) described it as such.”189 It was convenient for Hobson to 
describe Nene’s speech in this way, but “it does not necessarily follow that the position 
Nene articulated was the understanding of each rangatira when stepping forward to 
sign.”190 
 
Māori intentions are mentioned against in the next section: “From the Māori perspective, 
the main purpose was to retain a degree of chieftain authority and confirm Māori 
possession of land and taonga.”191 Again, this suggests Māori intentions in relation to the 
English text, not actual Māori intentions, which, were to retain sovereignty while 
allowing for a Governor for Pākehā. 
 
Law Alive is the only textbook of the three to engage at all with Māori law and Māori 
motivations for signing. It does not, however, do an adequate job of this. As I have 
outlined, Māori law is primarily discussed in the dispute resolution chapter, in relation to 
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its application in contemporary contexts. There is no discussion of what the treaty meant 
in the context of Māori law at the time. Like Joseph, Morris outlines British history and 
British motivations. Morris does not engage with Māori history, and his discussion of 
Māori motivations is limited and misleading. 
 
The failure of all three texts to adequately engage with Māori history, law and 
motivations for signing te Tiriti helps to bolster their explicit or implicit claims that the 
treaty was a voluntary cession of sovereignty. If the treaty is only understood in light of 
British intentions and motivations and in light of Eurocentric assumptions, it becomes 
possible to claim that the treaty was a voluntary cession of sovereignty. However, as 
discussed in Part II, for Māori, ceding sovereignty was both legally impossible and 
politically undesirable. If this was acknowledged by the authors, then the myth that the 
treaty ceded sovereignty would be severely weakened. 
 
C Downplaying of Textual Differences and English Text as “the” Treaty   
 
As I have discussed, the narrative that the treaty was a treaty of cession is premised on a 
lack of engagement with Māori history, law, and motivations for signing the treaty. The 
second theme underpinning the authors’ suggestions that the treaty was a cession of 
sovereignty is a focus on the English text. This entails, in each case, a failure to set out a 
translation of the Māori text, a downplaying of the significance of the textual differences, 
an inadequate or no discussion of the reasons for mistranslation, a failure to acknowledge 
that the Māori text was signed by most rangatira (in two of the books) and using the 
phrase “the Treaty” (or for Morris, “the treaty”) to refer to the content of the English text. 
I focus on the authors’ discussions of arts 1 and 2 because these are the main source of 
contention. 
 
Each author sets out both the English text in English, and te Tiriti in te reo Māori.192 
None of them provides a translation of te Tiriti in English – only translations of key 
terms. This means that readers who do not speak te reo Māori cannot read te Tiriti for 
themselves, and are reliant on each author’s interpretations. It also means that the English 
text is seen as the default, and te Tiriti is assessed against it, rather than the other way 
around. Finally, it means that the overall meaning of each text is not the focus of the 
discussion. Rather, the meanings of particular words are emphasised. As outlined in Part 
II, reading modern translations of te Tiriti, alongside an understanding of its context, 
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gives a much better sense of the document as a whole. Te Tiriti was about Māori 
retaining sovereignty while allowing a Governor to govern Pākehā. The English text was 
a cession of sovereignty. This difference is difficult to adequately convey without a full 
and accurate translation of te Tiriti.  
 
Each author does acknowledge the differences between the two texts. Joseph writes 
that:193 
 
Language difficulties beset articles 1 and 2, which ceded sovereignty and guaranteed 
the Crown’s protection. Article 1 accomplished the Crown’s objective (cession of 
sovereignty) but the translation of the word ‘sovereignty’ raises questions as to what 
Māori actually ceded at Waitangi. 
 
He points out that “kāwanatanga” meant “governorship”, which he describes as “the 
Crown’s right to impose law and order”.194 He also notes that “‘rangatiratanga’ … was a 
closer approximation to sovereignty than ‘kawanatanga’ used in art 1.”195 The differences 
between the texts are downplayed, with statements like, “The Maori language text was 
not an exact translation of the original English text approved by Hobson.”196 
 
In Bridled Power, the discussion of the texts is brief. The authors write that “[t]he first 
article expresses the cession of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘kawanatanga’ (which may be translated 
as ‘governorship’) by Māori to the Crown.”197 They do not explain what “kawanatanga” 
may have meant to Māori in 1840. They do not explain their translation to 
“governorship” or how “governorship” may differ from “sovereignty”. “Rangatiratanga” 
in art 2 is translated as “full chieftainship” while acknowledging that it can also be 
translated as sovereignty.198 
 
Palmer and Palmer then then turn to the issue of “the balance to be struck between the 
sovereignty/kawanatanga of the Crown and te tino rangatiratanga/chieftanship of 
Māori”.199 They state that “[m]ost debates concerning the Treaty’s meaning involve the 
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application of this question.”200 This language suggests that sovereignty and kāwanatanga 
are analogous concepts; and that rangatiratanga can be equated to chieftainship. This 
undermines the attempt to distinguish these concepts in the preceding paragraph.  
 
Palmer and Palmer then do briefly turn to the difference between sovereignty and 
rangatiratanga. They write that:201 
 
The rhetoric of ‘sovereignty’ versus ‘rangatiratanga’ is symbolic and abstract. A 
confrontational battle between the two could go on for years without the participants 
being sure whether they disagree. 
 
This overlooks that the assertion of rangatiratanga against the unfettered sovereignty of 
the Crown is one key element of Māori struggles for justice in New Zealand. Māori, and 
their tauiwi supporters, are clear about the meanings of sovereignty and rangatiratanga. 
To suggest that each side of this debate is unsure “whether they disagree” demonstrates a 
lack of understanding on the part of the authors as to the nature of this debate. 
 
Law Alive does a better job that the other textbooks of outlining the textual differences – 
although this is still limited to particular words and not the overall meaning. The words 
“kāwanatanga” and “rangatiratanga” are described as being flawed translations, and it is 
acknowledged that the two texts contradict each other “in key areas”.202 In relation to 
“kāwanatanga”, Morris writes that “[m]any experts believe it means a limited form of 
administrative government”.203 He writes “[t]he argument runs that many Māori thought 
the Governor would have only limited power”, which extended only over British citizens 
and would be subject to the authority of rangatira.204 
 
He also notes that “‘te tino rangatiratanga’ … denotes absolute sovereignty … [and] 
probably should have been used in Article 1 to describe Crown sovereignty.”205 As a 
result of this, “Māori could well have believed that they were allowing the Crown a 
limited form of sovereignty”, while a more powerful sovereignty was retained.206  
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On the page where the translation is set out, particular words in each text are highlighted, 
with accompanying text. In relation to “sovereignty” and “kāwanatanga”, the text 
includes “Māori may have believed they were allowing the British to govern while 
retaining sovereignty in Article 2”. In relation to “te tino rangatiratanga”, the text 
includes, “Māori may have believed they were retaining sovereignty”.207 The use of “may 
have believed” in relation to Māori suggests a downplaying of Māori understandings 
while British understandings are portrayed as authoritative. 
 
In sum, the authors of all three textbooks acknowledge the differences between te Tiriti 
and the English text, and engage in some explanation of these difference. However, they 
also downplay them. This downplaying is exacerbated by each author’s discussion of the 
reason for the mistranslation. Joseph writes:208 
 
For some historians, the Maori language text did not convey the true intentions of 
the colonising power. Maori did not understand European legal and literary 
traditions to embrace British conceptions of sovereignty and ownership. 
 
The use of the word “some” is misleading because it suggests that contemporary 
historians who argue that the mistranslation was deliberate are a minority, when actually 
most contemporary historians have this view.209 
 
Joseph then rejects the view that the contested history of the treaty is caused by haste or 
lack of expertise.210 He claims that “[t]hese explanations discount the legal coherence that 
underpins that Treaty” and that “[e]ach of the instrument’s articles assimilated existing 
common law doctrines or principles”,211 which he explains in some detail. He concludes 
that this “symmetry” between the treaty and common law “belies historians’ claims that 
the treaty was ‘contradictory’, the work of ‘amateurs’ and the cause of its contested 
history.”212 On the contrary, he argues that “[i]ts survival as a national symbol owes 
much to the dedication of its architects.”213 
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In my view, the English text reflecting common law doctrines is entirely unsurprising and 
unremarkable. What is actually contested about the treaty is the differences between the 
meaning and effect of the English text compared with the Māori text. The two texts 
contradict each other, as was explained in Part II. Joseph’s analysis of how the English 
text reflects the common law does nothing to explain the differences between that 
document and te Tiriti.  
 
Palmer and Palmer make no mention at all of the reason for the differences between the 
texts. This is unsurprising, given that they are dealing with the contemporary application 
of the treaty rather than its historical context. 
 
Morris suggests, in relation to the textual differences, that it “is not clear from the 
historical records whether this was a calculated ploy to encourage Māori acquiescence or 
just poor translating”.214 Like Joseph, he overstates the extent to which historians are 
divided on this point. He also goes as far to suggest that “[t]he other possibility is that 
Māori did understand that they were ceding complete sovereignty over New Zealand.”215 
This view does not make sense in light of Māori law and context. It also does not address 
that on its clear face, the Māori text was not a cession of sovereignty. 
 
A further element of emphasising the English text is a failure to acknowledge that it was 
the Māori text which was actually signed. Joseph does not make any mention of which 
text was signed, but, as discussed further below, his emphasis on the English text strongly 
implies either that the English text was signed or that both texts had the meaning of the 
English text.  
 
Palmer and Palmer fail to note that the Māori text that was signed by the majority of 
rangatira. They write, “Māori and English versions of the Treaty were signed at Waitangi 
on 6 February 1840” and subsequently “in many different places in New Zealand by the 
Crown and over 200 Māori chiefs.”216 This is misleading and inaccurate: as noted above, 
it was only the Māori text that was signed at Waitangi and by a total of around 500 
rangatira. The English text was only signed by 39 rangatira, but it was signed on the basis 
of oral discussions in Māori that did not convey the meaning of the English text. 
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Morris is the only author to point out that “it is important to remember that nearly all the 
chiefs signed the Māori version.”217 This is somewhat undermined by his emphasis on the 
English text elsewhere. 
 
Finally, all of the authors use the phrase “the Treaty” (or “the treaty”) to refer to the 
meaning of the English text. Joseph, for example, writes that “the Treaty is a short, sparse 
document, comprising … three articles of cession”.218 Further on in the book, reflecting 
on the potential contemporary role of the treaty, he describes it as “an instrument of 
cession from colonial times.”219 In addition, as discussed above, Joseph’s emphasis on 
the “legal coherence” illustrates his emphasis on the English text. 
 
Palmer and Palmer are clearly referring to the English text when referring to “the Treaty” 
as a general concept. For example, they write that “the Treaty symbolises the rights and 
obligations of Maori and the undertakings that were given to them when the Crown 
assumed authority,”220 and that “the substantive content of the Treaty lies in the 
safeguarding of Māori interests, balanced against the general interests of the government 
of New Zealand.”221 These quotes suggest a reliance on the English text, because it was 
only according to the English text that the Crown assumed sovereignty over the whole 
country.   
 
Morris also uses “the treaty” as a general concept to refer to the English text. As noted 
above, his discussion of Māori reasons for signing suggests Māori reasons for signing a 
treaty of cession. In the introduction to the chapter, it is claimed Māori and the Crown 
signed “a treaty transforming New Zealand into a British colony.”222 Later in the chapter, 
when discussing native title, Morris writes that “the treaty is a specific document of 
cession.”223  
 
The use of “the Treaty” to refer to a cession of sovereignty, that is, the meaning of the 
English text could imply that the English text was actually signed. It could also indicate 
that the texts were substantially similar, that is, both texts were a cession of sovereignty. 
Either interpretation undermines each author’s attempts to outline the differences 
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between the texts, and Morris’ acknowledgement that the Māori text was in fact signed. 
The failure of each author to set out a translation of the Māori text, the general 
downplaying of the differences and a lack of thorough engagement with the reasons for 
mistranslation also suggests an emphasis on the English text and the suggestion that “the 
treaty” was a voluntary cession of sovereignty. 
 
The downplaying of the significance of the differences between the texts and reliance on 
the English version of the treaty is one of the themes underpinning the myth that the 
treaty was a cession of sovereignty. The other theme, discussed in the previous Section, is 
a lack of engagement with Māori law, history, and motivations for signing te Tiriti. These 
two themes underpin, in slightly different ways, each author’s chapter on the treaty. They 
both bolster the explicit or implicit claim that the treaty was a cession of sovereignty. The 
myth of cession in turn underpins the claim that the treaty is, at least to some extent, the 
basis for the legitimacy of the Crown’s absolute sovereignty in New Zealand. I turn to 
this in the next Part. 
 
V Treaty Myths and Pākehā Constitutional Discourse 
 
So far, I have explored historical accounts of the context and meaning of the treaty and 
demonstrated the failure of public law texts to engage with these accounts. These texts 
perpetuate the myth that it was a treaty of cession. I have also discussed the important 
normative and pedagogical role of textbooks, which underpins my particular concern 
about how the treaty is represented in public law textbooks.  
 
In this final Part, I turn to why the myth that the treaty ceded sovereignty is so harmful – 
in public law textbooks and in general. The primary reason is because our understandings 
of the past shape the parameters of discussions about the present. The myth that the treaty 
ceded sovereignty is part of a broader narrative that the treaty legitimises, at least in part 
and in a political sense, the sovereignty that the Crown presently exercises. This narrative 
can be seen in each of the textbooks. It enables the continued reluctance of Pākehā to 
engage with the violent realities of colonisation. It also makes it difficult for Pākehā to 
engage in genuine conversations about how the treaty should be reflected in 
constitutional arrangements.  
 
A The Treaty as a Basis for the Crown’s Legitimacy 
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In Pākehā constitutional discourses, the treaty is generally seen as legitimising the 
Crown’s sovereignty. The textbooks illustrate this. Although none of the textbook authors 
present the treaty as the legal basis of sovereignty, they do all use it as a basis for a moral 
or political claim as to the legitimacy of that sovereignty. 
 
As discussed above, Joseph explicitly rejects the treaty as the legal basis for sovereignty. 
However, he does rely on the treaty as the basis for the legitimacy of the Crown’s 
sovereignty. In the chapter titled “Establishment of British Rule”, Joseph writes that:224 
 
… New Zealand came under British rule by settlement, albeit contingent upon the 
free consent of Māori. The Treaty of Waitangi was benign in intent but did not 
achieve for the colonial authorities the full and unqualified acquisition of the new 
territory. Its purposes were more ethereal, importing the concept of the honour of the 
Crown and ultimately legitimising the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty. 
 
This is an express claim to constitutional legitimacy. The idea of “free consent” illustrates 
a misunderstanding of the treaty and reliance on the English text as already noted in Part 
IV. Joseph expressly says that the treaty provides legitimacy to the Crown’s sovereignty, 
and the description of Britain’s intentions as “benign” further reinforces this. Elsewhere, 
Joseph describes the treaty as New Zealand’s “founding instrument”,225 and writes that it 
has “national and symbolic importance,”226 further bolstering the idea that it provides 
legitimacy to the Crown’s sovereignty. 
 
Palmer and Palmer also make explicit claims of legitimacy of the Crown based on the 
treaty. At the beginning of their treaty chapter they write that “the legitimacy of the 
system of government we have in New Zealand today owes much to the Treaty of 
Waitangi entered into between the Crown and Māori in 1840”.227 This is a claim to at 
least partial legitimacy. At the end of the chapter Palmer and Palmer make a stronger 
statement: “the Treaty is a key source of the New Zealand government’s moral and 
political claim to legitimacy in governing the country.”228 Further, they write that “the 
Treaty of Waitangi is an integral part of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements”229 
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Morris, on the other hand, does not expressly state that the treaty provides legitimacy to 
the Crown’s sovereignty. He does, however, describe the treaty as New Zealand’s 
founding constitutional document on several occasions.230 He also states that “the 
influence of our founding constitutional document can be seen in nearly every area of the 
legal system.”231 Read alongside his explicit statements that the treaty ceded sovereignty, 
the treaty is implicitly portrayed as the foundation for the Crown’s sovereignty. This 
means that Law Alive also suggests, albeit more subtly, that the Crown’s sovereign 
legitimacy stems, at least to some degree, from the treaty.  
 
Until the 1980s, the Crown did not look to the treaty as the moral or political basis for its 
sovereignty. However, growing challenges from Māori in the 1970s and 1980s forced the 
Crown to re-articulate this. This was supported by a shift in academic opinion. The 
Tribunal observed that from the 1970s “historians acknowledged that the rangatira signed 
and understood the Māori text of the treaty, and not the English one.”232 This had the 
effect of shifting the scholarship to better acknowledge Māori perspectives and has 
opened up debates about the nature of the treaty and its contemporary application.233 This 
activism and scholarly attention to the treaty led to what Nan Seuffert has described as a 
“crisis of unity” in the construction of the nation, forcing the Crown to re-articulate its 
position.234 
 
This pressure resulted in a discursive shift from the 1980s onwards. The Crown’s view of 
its sovereignty as expressed in its submissions to the Tribunal is that the treaty, while not 
the legal source of Crown sovereignty, was a necessary step in the process; and was the 
Crown’s means of fulfilling its self-imposed condition of acquiring Māori consent.235 The 
view that Māori consented to British sovereignty is based on the continued minimising of 
the meaning of the Māori text and he Whakaputanga, and reliance on the English text and 
Pākehā interpretations of history.  
 
Paul McHugh has written that the Crown’s evolving construction of its own sovereignty 
in this period is a “struggle to inject a modern sense of historical legitimacy into a set of 
constitutional arrangements built upon a contrary foundation.”236 This is because the 
  
230 Morris, above n 8, at 32, 82. 
231 At 82. 
232 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 441. 
233 At 441. 
234 Seuffert, above n 5, at 89. 
235 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 1, at 483. 
236 At 72.  
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Crown, judiciary, and academic writers increasingly emphasize the foundational nature of 
the treaty. At the same time, “the treaty” has been redefined in those same contexts to 
mean the “principles” of the treaty.237 This makes it possible to both claim that the treaty 
is foundational, and to continue to ignore the Māori text. For this reason, Mikaere writes 
that rather than “minimising the significance of the Treaty and ignoring Te Tiriti 
altogether, the Crown now embraces both,” while ensuring that its sovereignty “remains 
undisturbed”.238   
 
All three textbooks acknowledge the recent emergence of the orthodoxy that the treaty is 
foundational. For example, Joseph writes that “[t]he Treaty has not always enjoyed the 
national reverence it is currently accorded”, and that is has not generally been a focus of 
debate for Pākehā.239 Palmer and Palmer note that “judicial attitudes to the Treaty of 
Waitangi have undergone a remarkable transformation in the last 100 years.”240 Morris 
states several times that the treaty is now recognised as New Zealand’s founding 
constitutional document, while emphasising that this has not always been the case.241 All 
three books make explicit comparisons between the attitudes expressed in the Wi 
Parata242 and Lands243 cases.244 This suggests that, despite past flaws which can be 
relegated to history, New Zealand now has a progressive approach which recognises the 
treaty as foundational. 
 
The dichotomising between present, enlightened, treaty jurisprudence, and explicitly 
racist views in the past has been discussed at length by David Williams in the context of 
his analysis of Wi Parata. He writes that, “Distancing modern law from the colonial past, 
we seem to want to reject ‘a simple nullity’ as often and as vehemently as possible.”245 
The decision is “convenient”, because it “enables us to lambast the awful nineteenth-
century past, and implicitly praise our current more enlightened views.”246 Williams 
points out that the orthodoxy that the treaty is only recognisable to the extent that it is 
  
237 See generally Kelsey, above n 5. 
238 Mikaere, above n 5 at 138. 
239 Joseph, above n 6, at 51. 
240 Palmer and Palmer, above n 7, at 346. 
241 Morris, above n 8, at 32, 58, 74 and 82. 
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incorporated by statute “is not all that far distant from continuing to categorise the treaty 
itself as a simple nullity.”247 
 
Ranginui Walker has that argued that “[w]hile the government acknowledged the Treaty 
as the foundation of nationhood, it did so in a prevailing social climate of historical 
amnesia.”248 As I have discussed, the same is true of the textbook writers. Pākehā 
orthodoxy, as reflected in the textbooks, claims that the treaty is the foundation of our 
constitutional arrangements and legitimises the Crown’s sovereignty; while continuing to 
downplay or overlook the meaning of the Māori text. The overlooking of history is in 
itself deeply problematic, as I discuss in the following Section. 
 
B The Hidden Violence of Colonisation 
 
Colonisation involves both the physical violence, and philosophical and institutional 
violence in the form of redefining and reconstructing reality. Moana Jackson has argued 
that colonisation “is a story of the imposition of a philosophical construct as much as it is 
a tale of economic and military oppression.”249 He notes that unlike military power or 
disease, “the process of institutional imposition was always cloaked with a subtle and 
high-sounding rhetoric.”250 This rhetoric masks the inherently violent nature of 
colonisation. The redefinition of the treaty in recent decades “is a story that has more to 
do with a continuing but covert colonization than it does with acknowledging the 
truth.”251 This is because it continues to ignore the Māori text and assume the sovereignty 
of the Crown as self-evident.  
 
Writing in the Australian context about the Mabo court’s refusal to address questions of 
sovereignty, Penelope Pether has argued that scrutinising the discourses of constitutional 
law and national identity allows us to unmask the mythologies of constitutional identity 
which repress the violence of colonisation.252 She writes that by “analysing that space 
  
247 At 232. 
248 Ranginui Walker “The Treaty of Waitangi in the Postcolonial Era” in Michael Belgrave, Merata 
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within law which asserts or legitimates its legality, a space of self-evidence and so of 
forgetting”, it may be possible to return to the repressed question of indigenous 
sovereignty, and generate a postcolonial constitutional theory.253 I have attempted to 
unmask the constitutional discourse which says that the treaty ceded sovereignty in my 
analysis of the textbooks in Part IV. 
 
Seuffert, writing in New Zealand, has also described constitutional repression and 
violence. She argues that the fictional unity of the New Zealand nation state is built on 
deception and violence. This began with the deceptive translation of the treaty, and has 
continued through the repression of the Māori text.254 She argues that this repression is a 
necessary part of the unified narrative of New Zealand’s constitutional identity, that is, 
the narrative which says that New Zealand was founded on a cession of sovereignty by 
Māori.255 She argues that legal deceptions “are not marginal asides in the dominant story, 
they are integral to that story”.256 In my view, the textbooks also enact these legal 
deceptions; and as Seuffert writes, these deceptions are integral to the overall narrative of 
constitutional identity. 
 
C The Possibility of Imaginative Constitutional Transformation 
 
Constitutional transformation is the term used by Moana Jackson to describe the deep 
shift that is necessary in order to build a constitution grounded in he Whakaputanga and 
te Tiriti – as opposed to constitutional change, which involves tinkering with current 
arrangements.257 The main discourse of constitutional change in New Zealand is strongly 
premised on the idea that Parliamentary sovereignty is a foundational concept that cannot 
be questioned. This means that the questions asked are narrow, and are about tinkering 
with the existing Westminster-style system; excluding the possibility of Tiriti based 
constitutional relationships, while continuing to emphasise the supposedly foundational 
  
253 At 134. 
254 Seuffert, above n 5, at 69. 
255 At 77. 
256 At 93. 
257 Moana Jackson “Constitutional Transformation: An Interview with Moana Jackson” in Malcolm 
Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (eds) Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional 
Change (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2010) 325.  
46  
 
nature of the treaty. As O’Hagan has pointed out, Parliamentary sovereignty is 
fundamentally irreconcilable with te Tiriti o Waitangi.258 
 
The clash between “change” and “transformation” was apparent at a conference called 
“Building the Constitution” in 2000. Mikaere noted the strong resistance from the Pākehā 
attendees towards Māori contributions that centered te Tiriti. She noted that the Māori 
participants came up with a range of imaginative solutions, and that “By contrast, the 
feature that marked many of the Pākehā contributions to the discussion was a staggering 
lack of imagination and profound resistance to change.” There was a strong theme of “if 
it ain’t broke don’t fix it”, completely overlooking the continued insistence of the Māori 
attendees that the constitution was in fact broken.259 This conference produced a book 
with 47 papers, six of which focused on the treaty.260 Interestingly, the book resulting 
from the follow-up conference in 2010 contains 28 papers, only one of which is about the 
treaty.261 
 
Another illustration is the recent Constitutional Conversation. In its background paper, 
“The Conversation so Far”, the treaty is not listed as an “element” of the constitution, but 
it is noted that it is increasingly “regarded as the founding document of government in 
New Zealand.”262 Under the heading “foundations of the constitution”, are listed the rule 
of law, representative democracy and responsible government, and separation of 
powers.263 The treaty is the next sub-heading. The information there claims that it 
“enabled the British to establish a government in New Zealand”.264 In the chapter on the 
treaty, its recent history and contemporary role are set out, but there is no discussion of its 
context, meaning or effect in 1840.265 For these reasons, in her submission to the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel, Susan Healy argued that “knowledge of the country’s 
constitutional history is vital to informed discussion about our constitution”.266   
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Jane Kelsey has written that “we as a Pākehā nation need to take our own debate about 
nation building seriously”.267 She argues that colonial attitudes and patronising views 
towards Māori should not be acceptable “as a basis for nation building in the face of a 
documented history of colonial dispossession and cultural genocide.”268 However, as 
Mikaere points out, genuine nation building is not possible if Pākehā continue to ignore 
uncomfortable history. She argues that “Pākehā need to own up to the truth about how 
they have come to occupy their position of dominance in this country – and to deal with 
it.”269 
 
In my view, Kelsey and Mikaere are correct. It is vital that Pākehā learn the truth about 
the history of this country if we want to have meaningful conversations with Māori about 
appropriate constitutional relationships going forward. One aspect of learning the truth of 
New Zealand’s history is learning about the true context, motivations, and meaning of te 
Tiriti. 
 
What is the role of public law textbooks in all of this? Tim Howard has pointed out, in 
canvassing the ways forward for Pākehā in response to the Tribunal’s finding, that 
education is particularly important. He writes that education “grounded in the real history 
of Aotearoa” is lacking both schools and universities.270 Education about this history is 
necessary so that “younger people will be in more of a position to review how we Pākehā 
can be better in our relationships with tāngata whenua.”271 Legal textbooks have a key 
role to play in this education, because as discussed in Part II, they are used as a general 
reference by many people; as well as shaping the discourses in which law students – 
potential future constitutional lawyers – learn about the constitution.  
 
  
267 Jane Kelsey “Māori Political Legitimacy and Nation Building” (paper presented to Nation Building and 
Māori Development Conference, Hopuhopu, 30 August-1 September 2000) at 14, in Mikaere, above n 5 at 
90. See also Jane Kelsey “Te Tiriti is the Constitution” in Heather Came and Amy Zander (eds) State of the 
Pākehā Nation: Collected Waitangi Day Speeches and Essays 2006-2015 (eBook ed, Network Waitangi 
Whangarei, 2015) 34. 
268 At 14, in Mikaere, above n 5 at 90. 
269 Mikaere, above n 5 at 91.  
270 Tim Howard “A place in the circle” in Heather Came and Amy Zander (eds) State of the Pākehā Nation: 
Collected Waitangi Day Speeches and Essays 2006-2015 (eBook ed, Network Waitangi Whangarei, 2015) 
152 at 157. 
271 At 157. 
48  
 
Each of the textbooks gives give readers the sense that, first, the treaty was a cession of 
sovereignty; and secondly that it provides at least some of the basis for the legitimacy of 
the absolute sovereignty of the Crown. This contributes to discourses about constitutional 
change being confined within a narrow scope. Genuine constitutional transformation 
which honours te Tiriti requires an understanding of history and a willingness to engage – 
but the textbooks’ perpetuation of the myth of cession denies this possibility. 
 
VI Conclusion 
  
As the Tribunal has confirmed, the treaty was not a cession of sovereignty. It would have 
been both legally and politically impossible for Māori to cede sovereignty in 1840. In the 
text of te Tiriti, the document that was signed by around 500 rangatira and Hobson, 
“rangatiratanga”, which can be roughly equated to sovereignty, was expressly retained – 
while making room for a Governor for Pākehā. For these reasons, the treaty cannot be the 
moral or political basis for the undivided sovereignty of the Crown.  
 
The Tribunal’s finding was consistent with several decades of scholarly work – especially 
of historians but also some legal academics – on the treaty. Despite the existence of this 
scholarship, the three main public law textbooks all portray the treaty as a treaty of 
cession.  This is concerning given the wide audience that these textbooks have, and the 
influence that they have in both describing and also shaping constitutional discourses.  
 
The textbooks’ portrayal of the treaty as a cession of sovereignty is explicit, for Joseph 
and Morris, and more subtle for Palmer and Palmer. All three texts have two themes 
underpinning this narrative. First, they all fail to engage at all (Joseph and Palmer and 
Palmer) or adequately (Morris) with Māori law, history, and motivations for signing. 
Secondly, they all portray the English text as the treaty – in particular by downplaying the 
differences between the texts and the reasons for these differences; and by referring to the 
meaning of the English text as “the Treaty”. 
 
The myth that the treaty ceded sovereignty is pervasive in Pākehā constitutional 
discourse, and the textbooks illustrate this. Each textbook uses the treaty as at least a 
partial basis for the legitimacy of the absolute sovereignty of the Crown. This allows the 
violent colonial process through which the Crown actually gained its power to remain 
hidden. It also has the effect of narrowing the parameters for discussions of future 
constitutional arrangements; making imaginative discussions of Tiriti-based 
constitutional transformation completely outside the scope of most Pākehā discussions.  
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By shedding light on these myths, it is my hope to open up space for Pākehā to engage 
with alternative constitutional discourses. The treaty can provide for a legitimate place 
for Pākehā and other tauiwi in New Zealand – that is exactly what was intended. 
However, Pākehā have claimed far more than what was agreed to in 1840. Pākehā need to 
learn our own history and understand how we came to hold a position of dominance in 
this country. Only then can we engage in meaningful conversations with Māori about 
how this relationship might work moving forward.  
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